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Synopsis
Economic reform - the introduction of elements of the 
market into a planned economy - has been the central 
political problem for socialist states for at least three 
decades. This thesis seeks to elucidate the nature of the 
problem through a reconsideration of the general theoretical 
issues, and through a comparative analysis of the practice 
of economic reform in two countries - Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary.
In Part One, the arguments in favour of the use of 
the market in socialism are recapitulated, and the 
implications of various socialist economic models for 
political freedom, democracy, and the realisation of some 
concept of the 'social interest 1 are discussed.
The case studies presented in Part Two address the 
practical political problem of introducing market-type 
reform into communist systems. In Czechoslovakia, the issue 
of economic reform contributed to a profound political 
crisis culminating in 1968. But it is argued, economic 
reform was not the only, or even the most important source 
of the crisis. In the different political conditions in 
Hungary, economic reform was embraced by the regime as a 
means of securing political stability and popular 
legitimacy. Political crisis was avoided, but at the cost
of compromise in the economic reform. The conclusion is that 
while full-scale democratisation of the political system may 
not be an inevitable concomitant of economic reform, 
profound changes in the style and instruments of communist 
rule are required.
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Introduction
The central assumption upon which the theory of 
socialism is founded is that there exists a 'social 
interest 1 , and the central aim of socialism is the 
realisation of the 'social interest 1 through the 
organisation of the economy. The idea of a 'social 
interest 1 or 'common good' is not unique to socialism of 
course, appearing in classical political philosophy, 
Christian theology, and also in the rational liberalism of 
the Enlightenment. The socialist concept of the 'social 
interest' derives most directly from the last tradition of 
thought, taking over key elements of Enlightenment 
philosophy and recombining them into a distinctive new 
synthesis. The 'social interest 1 in socialist theory 
involves both rationalism and egalitarianism. Socialism in 
practice is to realise 'true 1 freedom and democracy by 
abolishing the material inequalities between men arising 
from the private ownership of the means of production, and 
by rationally using the economic resources of society to 
meet 'social need', not individually appropriated profit, 
through 'conscious, planned control' of the economy. A 
classical statement of the aims, formulated by Marx, puts it 
thus:
The national centralisation of the means of 
production will become the natural base for a 
society which will consist of an association of 
free and equal producers acting consciously 
according to a general and rational plan.
Socialists traditionally have seen the market as 
'anarchic 1 and therefore irrational, productive of cyclical
economic crises and wasteful of both human and material 
resources; and also as the source of class division, social 
inequality and exploitation. The 'freedom 1 proclaimed by 
the ideologists of liberal capitalism was argued to be 
fundamentally vitiated by its limitation to political rights 
alone. Socialists take up the argument that power has an 
economic dimension too, and they hold that men cannot be 
free where they are not equal in respect of their most basic 
conditions of existence. Private ownership of the means of 
production deprives non-owners of the possibility of free 
self-realisation, since they are dependent for their 
productive activity - identified as the central 
characteristic of human existence - on access to the means 
of production which are owned and controlled by others. 
Furthermore, the market is argued to be a source of human 
'alienation 1 . Productive activity is guided not consciously 
and directly according to 'real social need', but abstractly 
and indirectly through the pursuit of profit, accruing to 
individual capitalists as the result of productive activity 
which is essentially a cooperative, social effort.
On the basis of such argumentation, by the time of the
first practical attempt to create a socialist society, in
Russia following the Revolution, there was no dispute among
socialists that the superiority of socialism would find
expression in the abolition of private ownership of the
means of production and the direction of the economy through
central planning, which definitely excluded use of the
market. But even before the first experiement in the
practical application of socialism had had time to provide
convincing evidence, non-socialist theorists had identified
crucial problems of principle with the socialist argument, 
which led them to predict that in practice, the socialist 
'utopia 1 would be neither rational nor democratic. 
Subsequently, the experience of central planning in the 
Soviet Union and, after the Second World War, in Eastern 
Europe, appeared to confirm this pessimistic conclusion.
In this first part of the thesis, we will examine
socialist theory from the two angles of rationality and
democracy. Although in the theory, the question of the
economic_rationality of the socialist economy is argued to
be inseparably bound up with the claim that socialism will
be more democratic, free and_equal as a political system
than liberal capitalism, for analytical purposes, the two
questions will be treated in separate chapters. Thus
Chapter I tackles the arguments about the socialist economy
as a rational means to securing production in the 'social
interest 1 . To what extent can rational use of the means of
production towards any end be made without the market? This
is the question posed in the first section (A) of the
chapter by anti-socialist liberals such as Ludwig von Mises
and F A Hayek. The socialist economist, Oskar Lange,
responded with his 'Competitive solution 1 , by which he
attempted to show how a Central Planning Board could arrive
at an economical plan based on rational prices defined
through simulation of the functioning of the market. In
practical terms, however, the 'Competitive solution'
appeared unrealisable. Thus a real, functioning market
seems to be essential to rational economic activity:
Section B of the chapter starts from this premise. The
question is now to what extent the market can be made to
serve the 'social interest 1 in the economy. The Yugoslav 
concept of self-management makes full use of the market, and 
thus demonstrates the theoretical independence of the market 
from private ownership of the means of production. But to 
what extent does the self-management model meet the 
socialist criterion of production guided by the 'social 
interest 1 ? The Polish economist WJodzimierz Brus argues 
that it does not. He provides an alternative model, the 
'regulated market', which attempts to combine the advantages 
of the market with a powerful central authority essential, 
in his view, to the overall coordination of the economny, 
and thus to the realisation in practice of the 'social 
interest'.
The second chapter tackles the political questions 
raised by the various concepts of socialist economic 
systems. The key questions are: what implications for 
freedom and democracy flow from the different concepts of 
the 'social interest 1 embodied in the respective models? 
Are freedom and democracy logically compatible with each 
definition of the 'social interest'? Are freedom and 
democracy necessary conditions or consequences of the 
functioning of the respective models?
CHAPTER ONE
ECONOMICS
Section A:_The Anti-socialist Case
It was Ludwig von Mises who, in 1920, threw down the 
gauntlet which began the 'Great Debate' on the rationality 
of the socialist economy among academic economists. He 
argued that under socialism, with the abolition of the 
market, there can be no objective indicator of value, which 
will be supplanted by the politically-based preferences of 
the State administration. While the State may be able to 
obtain knowledge of what commodities are required by 
society, and thus draw up a coherent list of priorities of 
'social need', it will be unable to direct the use of the 
means of production rationally to the given ends, since it 
will have no way of calculating their relative values. 
Prices in this sector would no necessity be arbitrary, and 
could give no information on relative scarcity. Thus there 
would be no possibility of calculating costs of production, 
and therefore no possibility of producing the commodities 
identified as needed in an efficient, economical way:
In place of the economy of the "anarchic" method of 
production, recourse will be had to the senseless 
output of an absurd apparatus.- The wheels will 
turn, but will run to no effect.
For von Mises, the market mechanism is inseparable 
from private property in the means of production, since the 
motive force of the market economy is the drive to maximise
profit. The pursuit of private material gain is what
'induces entrepreneurs to appropriately limit their demand
2 for factors of production to cost-minimising proportions'.
The search for profit thus acts towards the efficient 
allocation of resources in a competitive market economy; it 
is at the same time the basis for individual motivation. 
Von Mises sees the lack of personal responsibility, and of 
opportunity for individual initiative, as an inherent 
feature of socialism, which further reduces the possibility 
of rational economic activity, since there can be no direct 
relationship between individual effort and reward: 'While 
the well-being of any particular individual is dependent on
the diligence of others, one's own welfare is independent of
3 one's own diligence'.
The argument was later further elaborated by F A 
Hayek, for whom the central flaw in the socialist proposals 
was the assumption of the possibility of an omniscient 
centre, capable of amassing the sheer quantity of 
information necessary to the 'objective' definition of an 
unambiguous 'social interest' in every detail:
The economic problem of society is not merely a 
problem of how to allocate 'given' resources - if
'given' is taken to mean given to a single mind 
which deliberately solves the problem set by these
'data 1 . It is rather a problem of how to secure 
the best use of resources known to any of the 
members of society, for ends whose relative 
importance only these individuals know. Or, to put 
it briefly, it is a problem of the utilisation of 
knowledge not given to anyone in its totality.
The knowledge required for rational economic activity 
is not only, or even mainly scientific knowledge - if it 
were, then Hayek concedes that a 'body of suitably chosen 
experts may be in the best position to command all the best
knowledge available 1 . 5 But the larger part of relevant 
knowledge is not of this type - it is unorganised, intimate 
local knowledge of the particularities of time and place, 
which, moreover, are in a state of constant change. The 
sheer quantity of information which planners would have to 
have amassed would be quite overwhelming, unless their 
statistics contained some degree of aggregation, 
'abstracting from minor differences between the things, by 
lumping together, as resources of one kind, items which 
differ as regards location, quality, and other particulars, 
in a way which may be very significant for the specific 
decision'. It is thus inescapably a less efficient system 
of knowledge.
It is the price mechanism which, in the market 
economy, can deal with the specific, local information, and 
the state of constant change, 'by attaching to each scarce 
resource a numerical index which cannot be derived from any 
property possessed by that particular thing, but which 
reflects, or in which is condensed, its significance in view 
of the whole means-end structure*. Hayek's point is that 
it is simply not necessary for rational economic activity 
that all or any of the participants know everything about 
the whole economy - it is only necessary that each possess 
sufficient information to enable him to carry out his own 
particular individual task. The spontaneous adjustments of 
the price system both provide information in an intelligible 
form, and integrate individuals' activities without the 
intermediation of a 'superior intelligence 1 .
The Polish economist Oskar Lange attempted to counter 
these arguments in his 'Competitive solution 1 , by which he
8sought to show that a rational system of efficiency pricing 
could be constructed, without the operation of a free
Q
market, in the context of a socialised economy. The model 
assumes free choice of occupation and consumer goods. A 
Central Planning Board (CPB) is responsible for setting the 
prices of goods and services, including the interest rate on 
capital. The point is to demonstrate how this price setting 
can be made 'rational', rather than 'arbitrary 1 or purely 
political, without the operation of a free market.
In practice, the CPB's initial set of prices would be 
based on the historical experience of relative values, taken 
over from the free prices of the previous market economy, 
and so they need not be wildly off the mark. Managers of 
enterprises are instructed to regard prices as 'parametric', 
that is, although they know prices have been consciously set 
by the CPB, they must treat them as if they were independent 
of any individual actions, by themselves or by others (as do 
participants in a perfectly competitive market). The 
objective function of managers is no longer the maximisation 
of profit, but to 'produce exactly as much of a commodity as 
can be sold or "accounted for" to other industries at a
price which equals the marginal cost incurred by the
9 industry in producing this amount'. In doing this, the
managers are to observe two rules set by the CPB: 'Use 
always the method of production (i.e. combination of 
factors) which minimises average costs and... produce as 
much of each commodity as will equalise marginal cost and 
the price of the product'.
On the basis of these rules, for each price set, a 
given quantity of goods will be supplied. If supply does
not match demand, there will be a clear indication of this 
to the CPB: 'Any price different from the equilibrium price 
would show at the end of the accounting period a surplus or 
a shortage of the commodity in question 1 . The CPB would 
then merely alter the price to rectify the situation. 
Through this 'trial-and-error' process, analogous to the 
prices in a competitive market, but taking place without it, 
short-run equilibrium is reached, thus, in effect - insofar 
as the CPB is merely reacting passively to changes in demand 
and costs of production - merely simulating the operation of 
the free market. Why then have a CPB at all?
The answer is that by concentrating price setting 
authority in the hands of the CPB, at crucial points prices 
which differ from free market prices can be enforced, and 
thus, overall, the economy can be guided in the 'social 
interest 1 . The CPB can intervene to set accounting prices 
to enterprises which differ from the prices paid by 
consumers, where such a move is felt to be justified by 
considerations of social welfare. Significantly, Lange 
observes that this opportunity must be fairly limited 
(although he does not specify the means by which such limits 
might be determined), since its widespread use would be 
politically unacceptable, implying that the CPB had a 
different scale of values and priorities from the people as
u i I 2 a whole.
Further advantages Lange claims for this system derive 
from the possibility it affords of rational control over the 
overall rate of saving, thus offerring a long-term 
perspective which the market is unable to provide; from the 
possibility of allowing for 'externalities' in prices, thus
10
rendering prices a more accurate reflection of true social 
costs; and from the realisation of social justice in 
distribution, which requires more detailed explanation.
While households, having free choice of occupation, 
sell their labour to the highest bidder, or in such a way as 
to maximise utility (i,.e. weighing up material reward 
against the content or location of work, or the degree of 
leisure time allowed), the market is not left to determine 
the final distribution of income. A social dividend, 
derived from the return on capital and land, which would, 
under private ownership, have accrued to individual 
proprietors, is also paid out by the CPB, but in such a way 
as not to interfere with the function of wages in obtaining 
optimum distribution of labour services between different 
occupations and industries. The social dividend may be used 
to compensate for economically unjustified inequality, such 
as that arising from variation in the number of dependents 
per given wage earner. The system can thus approximate more 
closely than the free market to maximum social welfare - 
where market demand at each price will reflect the relative 
urgency of the needs of different individuals - since the 
equality of income required for that effect will only be 
departed from to the extent to which income differentiation 
reflects the marginal disutility to the individual of the 
pursuit of any given occupation. This contrasts with 
capitalism, where private ownership determines to a large 
extent the distribution of income, and large inequalities
prevail.
However, this ingenious 'solution' to the problem of 
economic calculation in socialism was found by Hayek to
11
suffer from serious shortcomings:
There is of course no logical_impossibility of 
conceiving a distinct organ of the collective 
economy which... would be in a position to change 
without delay every price by just the amount 
required. When, however, one proceeds to consider 
the actual apparatus by which this sort of 
adjustment is to be brought about, one begins to 
wonder whether anyone should be prepared to suggest 
that, within the domain of practical possibility, 
such a system will ever distantly approach the 
efficiency of a system where the required changes 
are brought about by the spontaneous action of the 
persons immediately concerned.
Lange's model does not answer Hayek's point noted 
earlier, that the planners will be forced to deal in 
statistical aggregates. The feasibility of the model, no 
less than in the case of the non-price planning model, 
depends on the CPB only dealing with large, general 
categories of goods. Thus small but significant differences 
between goods will be ignored, with the result that 'a great 
many prices would be at most times in such a system
substantially different from what they would be in a free
14 system 1 , and to that extent it would produce inefficient,
irrational results.
Nor can the model cope with Hayek's insistence on the 
inevitability in the real world of constant change. Lange 
is preoccupied with efficiency in terms of static 
equilibrium. It is assumed that once an equilibrium price 
is found, it will remain stable for long periods. But, as 
Hayek sees it,
The practical problem is not whether a particular 
method would eventually lead to a hypothetical 
equilibrium, but which method will secure the more 
rapid and complete adjustment to the daily changing 
conditions - Jin different places and different 
industries.
If prices are set by the CPB for fixed periods,
12
changes in conditions within those periods will mean that 
prices are no longer reliable as guides to rational economic 
activity. But the requirement for constant adjustment of 
prices would be a truly vast apparatus, which must be 
cumbersome and slow-moving in operation, thus reducing the 
effectiveness of the information transmitted by prices, and 
creating further problems of integration within the CPB 
itself - to say nothing of the costs of maintaining this 
army of non-productive bureaucratic workers.
1 Bureaucratisation 1 as an inherent tendency of the 
Lange model is further promoted by the problem of 
motivation. How is a system of incentives to be constructed 
to induce managers to observe the rules set by the CPB? 
Lange nowhere provided a clear criterion for judging and 
rewarding managerial success. Unlike in the capitalist 
market economy, managers cannot simply be judged by 
enterprise profits, since (a) they are not instructed to 
maximise enterprise profits; and (b) the size of the profit 
they produce, if they follow the two rules of behaviour set 
by the CPB, is determined by the centrally set prices. Thus 
what is required is some means by which the CPB can check 
that the rules themselves had been followed scrupulously. 
But this would require probing deeply into the enterprise's 
internal records:
This will not be a perfunctory auditing directed to 
find out whether his [the manager's] costs have 
actually been what he says they have been. It will 
have to establish whether they have been the lowest 
ones. This means that the control will have to 
consider not only what he actually did, but 3lso 
what he might have done and ought to have done.
The requirement would be for a considerable extension 
of the CPB's activities, and thus of course, of its
j-dj.j.uit: yredU-iy cxutjeu uiie yd-Lus U.L auuueaa• j_n sui
circumstances, it is only rational for managers to pref<
13
personnel, which, as Bergson notes, 'it is a cardinal 
concern of the Competitive solution to limit 1 .
How are managers to be induced to take risks? Lange 
provides no indication of the means which might be built 
into the model to overcome the 'asymmetry 1 of the effects of 
success and failure for the manager, where the penalties for 
fail re g atl e ce d th gains of s ccess. I ch
.er
safe but unspectacular progress to the greater but less 
assured benefits of, for example, a policy of substantial 
innovation. Moreover, the fact that prices are set 
consciously and deliberately by an identifiable body, rather 
than emerging spontaneously and impersonally through the 
market, adds an extra dimension. Anticipation of future 
price changes is an important part of managerial 
decision-making, especially where risk is concerned. But a 
manager 'can hardly be held responsible for anticipating
future changes correctly, if these changes depend entirely
18 on the decision of the authority 1 , while at the same time,
managers will be tempted to try to mitigate risks by direct 
appeal to, or pressure on, the price setters. And what 
happens if the price setters get it wrong? As Bergson
notes, 'responsibility for such error might easily become
19 controversial'. Inescapably, managers will be dependent
on their superiors for assessment, and so, 'in consequence 
all the difficulties will arise in connection with freedom
of initiative and the assessment of responsibility which are
20 usually associated with bureaucracy'. Lange himself
conceded as much:
It seems to us indeed, that the real danger of 
socialism_is that of the bureaucratisation of
economic life...' ^
14
Section B; Alternative Models of 'Market Socialism'
It was not so much the arguments of the anti-socialist 
theorists as the practical experience of central planning in 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe which provoked further 
attempts to come to grips with the problem of the market and 
socialism. What Hayek and other liberals concluded on the 
basis of logic had become evident in practice. 'Real 
Socialism' was both economically inefficient and 
undemocratic. In contrast to Lange's 'Competitive 
solution 1 , the possibility which socialist theorists now 
contemplated was the use of a real, functioning market 
within the context of social ownership of the means of 
production. The theoretical task was twofold - to 
demonstrate the logical independence of the market from 
private property, and to show how a market was, furthermore, 
compatible with the socialist aim of production guided by 
the criterion of the 'social interest 1 .
The first attempt to tackle this task was made in
Yugoslavia after 1950. Following the expulsion of the
Yugoslav communists from the Cominform in 1948, the
leadership came to see it as necessary to develop a
full-blown alternative to Stalinist model, hitherto equated
with socialism itself, for the the purposes of legitimating
a regime now isolated and excommunicated from the world
communist movement. The Yugoslavs took up the idea of
self-management. (It should be noted that in the discussion
of the model that follows, we will not be referring to the
way in which the Yugoslav economy works in practice, but to
the essential general principles which lie behind it.)
15
The basic principle of the model is maximum 
decentralisation, where
... decision-making is carried out on a lower level 
and... only those decisions are reserved to a 
higher level which otherwise would lead to damage 
of the interests of some individuals or groups.22
Self-management of the enterprise is exercised by a Workers' 
Council, elected by all members of the enterprise 
collective, which has basic responsibility for determining 
the goals of the enterprise. Day-to-day operational 
management is entrusted to a managerial board, headed up by 
the enterprise director, who is appointed by the Workers' 
Council, but who may, in the interests of effective 
coordination of the executive managerial function, nominate
his own managerial subordinates, with the approval of the
93 
Workers' Council.
Decision-making by autonomous self-managed enterprises 
is thus guided not by directive targets set 'from above' by 
a command plan, but by the self-interest of the members of 
the enterprise collective, realised on a competitive market.
The 'vertical' system of coordination of central planning is
24 thus replaced by 'horizontal' market-based relations. The
objective function of the self-managed enterprise is not the 
same, however, as that of the capitalist firm, since a 
collective, in pursuit of its members' self-interest, will 
tend to focus on maximisation of net income per employee, 
rather than profit. Thus labour-power is not a 'commodity', 
as it is in the capitalist system - reward is determined not 
as 'wages' according to supply and demand on the market, but 
as a share in the residual surplus earned from sales of the 
enterprise's products on the market, after deductions for
16
depreciation, taxation, etc. The distribution of income 
within the enterprise - the shares to be allocated to 
members of the collective according to their contributions 
to the final output - is decided democratically by the 
collective. The broader social distribution, between 
enterprises, branches and regions, is, in principle, left to 
the market to determine.
This system does not, however, altogether exclude 
planning or the role of the State from the economy. But it 
is planning of a very different type from that envisaged by 
traditional socialists and their critics; and the role of 
the State is seen not as replacing the market but as 
complementing it:
In this context, the state political centre emerges 
as the source of regulatory impulses which reflect 
the constant, previously anticipated rules of the 
market. On that basis economic decision-makers 
obtain reliable parameters for their decisions and, 
seeking to maximise their incomes, carry out the 
intentions of the plan by their own initiative. In 
that way the plan and its adequate fulfilment 
represent the necessary condition for the autonomy 
of enterprises.
The type of planning involved here, in contrast to the 
'command* model previously seen as the only possible form of 
planning, is 'indicative'. Like command planning, however, 
this form of planning is not specifically tied to socialist 
forms of economy, but can also be found in the experience of 
capitalist economies, such as France, where there have 
existed traditions of a strong central state, and of 
interventionism and cooperation rather than the competitive
o t:
individualism assumed by Hayek. The main characteristics 
of indicative planning have been defined by Egon Neuberger 
as follows:
17
Firstly, the plan is not drawn up by an autonomous 
team of experts, but emerges from a process of consultation 
and bargaining among representatives of the major groups 
involved in economic activity. In the French case, this has 
included business, employers', labour and consumer 
representatives, with the government participating merely as 
'first among equals'. Regional representation might also be 
included. The object of bargaining would be to arrive at 
consensus on the broad, general goals of economic policy, 
and the focus would tend to be long-term rather than 
immediate.
Secondly, motivation to comply with the plan derives 
not from compulsion but from self-interest, and also from 
'solidarity' - that is, the conscious and willing 
subordination of self-interest to the 'good of the 
community'. Nobody would have the right to enforce 
compliance upon enterprises. The only sanction would be 
economic, exerted through the market on an enterprise which 
wrong-headedly disregarded the plan framework. The 
enterprise thus has the right to disregard the plan if it 
considers it contrary to its interests.
Thirdly, the indicative plan produces not compulsory 
targets, but a centralised source of information on the 
current and projected future market, made available to all 
those engaged in economic activity. The assumption is that 
the provision of information alone is sufficient to 
influence enterprise behaviour. Given that the market 
provides only imperfect information on future prices, costs 
and demand, this may be able to overcome such negative 
features of the operation of the market was wasteful
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duplication of investment, the lack of information about the 
future intentions of other firms and so on, which can 
greatly improve the possibilities of rational planning 
within the firm. 27
However, there are other aspects of the role of the 
State in this model which are necessary to its economic 
viability. A variety of state institutions is necessary in
*) O
addition to the Planning Board. Economic ministries would 
be established to carry out economic policy measures. The 
overall control of the money market would be maintained 
through a National Bank, with regulatory powers over 
commerical banks operating directly on the market. A Social 
Accounting Service would be responsible for verification of 
the legality of enterprise activity, without having any 
powers of command over enterprises. Horvat also envisages 
two Intervention Funds, with responsibility, and the 
resources, for smoothing out price fluctuations in 
agriculture and in materials supply. A third intervention 
fund would also back exports. This would be necessary to 
counteract 'unfair competition' on the world market, which 
is 'under the control of mammoth multinational corporations, 
international cartels, and state and intergovernmental
9 Qorganisations'. There would also be an Arbitration Board 
for Incomes and Prices, both to combat abuse of monopoly and 
to check against government measures which discriminate 
against a particular industry (and to determine, where 
necessary, the level of compensation to be made). All these 
institutions are aimed at stabilising and equalising 
conditions on the market. A further essential function is 
the stimulation of growth, and, closely connected with it,
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the establishment of new enterprises.
A key set of problems of the self-managed market 
economy, manifesting themselves rather differently from in 
the capitalist case, is the establishment and entry on to 
the market of new firms, the associated problem of monopoly, 
and the broader question of investment.
In the context of self-management, responsibility for
setting up new enterprises may rest not only with the
central State, but also with local public authorities,
enterprises, groups of workers and individuals. In
practice, the possibilities of the latter two will be
restricted in the context of a socialist economy by the
improbability of their disposing of sufficient capital for
setting up a firm independently, or of being able to obtain
a sufficiently large bank loan. Furthermore, enterprises'
willingness to invest in new firms is likely to be fairly
low, given that, firstly, where resources exist in a firm
over and above its own investment needs, there will be
considerable pressure to distribute this for increased
consumption; and that, secondly, there will be an absence of
incentive to invest outside the firm, where the workers of
an existing enterprise are not allowed to derive an income
from such investment - since the only legitimate claim to an
income is from participation in work at one's own
enterprise. Thus the major role in the establishment of new
firms will fall to state authorities at both central and
local levels, which must therefore be able to draw resources
in the form of taxation from existing firms. In principle,
once the State has intervened to establish a new firm, it
will withdraw, handing all decision-making authority over to
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the Workers' Council of the newly formed enterprise 
collective. The State will decide on where to invest in new 
firms according to information derived from the market, and 
it can use this form of intervention to counteract monopoly, 
which is likely to be a crucial problem for the self-managed 
economy, as for the capitalist economy; and to maintain full 
employment, which, while it is a vital condition of an 
identifiably 'socialist 1 economy, is also likely to be a 
problem area, for the reason given that the self-managed 
firm, maximising net income per employee, will tend to opt
for more capital-intensive means of increasing output that
30 the capitalist firm maximising profit. In principle,
short-run equilibrium will be reached at a lower level of
employment, ceteris paribus, than in the capitalist economy.
It should be noted that, in principle, it appears that
the State will have no direct control over the basic
macro-economic decision on the overall rate of saving and
investment in the economy. This is left to the market. The
primary source of investment funds will be enterprise
profit, supplemented to a greater or lesser extent by
commercial bank loans. The instruments available to the
State to promote economic growth will thus be limited to
those available to the government of a capitalist economic
system - for example, taxation policy. These instruments
would be supplemented, but not radically altered in
character, by Horvat's proposed Interventionary Investment
Fund, which has two tasks:
(a) to participate in financing those projects that 
require an exceptionally large concentration of 
capital and/or long period of construction; and (b) 
to intervene in eliminating disproportions in 
capacity...whenever for some reason the market does 
not succeed in balancing supply and demand.
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A further subdivision of the fund would concentrate on 
regional development:
Economic growth can always be accelerated if 
pockets of insufficiently employed human and 
natural resources are eliminated, or in other 
words, if the development of underdeveloped regions 
is accelerated.
In assessing this model, we can start from the point 
that it can be expected to maximise the accepted advantages 
of the market in terms of rationality and efficiency. 
Although it has been argued that a self-managed firm will
operate rather differently from a capitalist firm under
33 similar market conditions, the State can be given
resources to enable it to counteract dysfunctional 
tendencies, particuarly associated with employment levels. 
The role of the State, supplementing not replacing the
market, would appear to go no further than that identified
34 by Hayek as compatible with a market economy. But
precisely for this reason, it has been noted that 'it seems 
odd that many socialists who recognised the problems arising 
from decentralised capitalism with some acuity have not
considered how far such problems may be endemic to all
35 decentralised economic systems'. For example, the problem
of 'externalities', and the irrationalities associated with 
it will recur in the self-management model, since 'such 
problems as pollution are clearly not confined to 
capitalism 1 . 36 Yet more serious problems for a system 
purporting to be 'socialist' are income distribution, 
inflation and long-term development/investment.
Incomes, according to the socialist principle, are to 
be derived only from work - more precisely, from one's
22
direct and immediate contribution to the work effort of a 
collective of which one is a member. 'Distribution 
according to work 1 means, in this model, 'distribution 
according to the results of work' 37 - that is, according to 
the judgement of the market on the results of work, rather 
than according to type of work, qualification and skill. 
Differentiation according to these latter criteria can be 
democratically decided within the enterprise in its 
decision-making about distribution of its own income among 
members; but the situation could well arise where an 
unskilled worker in a successful firm earned more than a 
skilled worker in an unsuccessful firm. This is likely to 
be controversial in the context of a socialist economy, as 
it will obscure the relationship between the individual 
worker's efforts and his or her reward, especially where the 
conditions for enterprises competing on the market are not 
equal. External factors, such as changes in the world 
market conditions, or the historical legacy of the past 
privileged conditions for a particular branch will 
inevitably intervene - in which case differences in incomes
may be more accurately described as economic rent, rather
38 
than as reward for actual work performed. This is
especially likely where the predominant part of investment 
resources is left at the disposition of enterprises, since 
past success will secure future advantages for the 
enterprise in giving it greater opportunities to invest and 
modernise. Inequalities will thus tend to be cumulative, as 
'success breeds success', and a concentration of capital 
occurs, with the result that
The government is faced with the unpleasant choice 
of attempting to tax away excess profits from rich
23
enterprises and to subsidise poor ones, thereby 
lessening incentives, or allowing highly 
inequitable income differentials to continue, with 
obvious political, social and economic 
consequences.
The model also has implications for the problem of 
inflation. It has been argued by Jan Vanek that the 
self-managed economy may be less prone to inflation insofar 
as this is due to 'wage-push 1 factors in capitalist
economies, since wage-labour is abolished and earnings are a
40 residual. But James Meade notes that this is a simplistic
approach - wage-push is not the only cause of inflation. 
In a self-managed economy, an increase in effective demand 
leads to firms raising prices. In a capitalist market, this 
situation increases the incentive to expand investment in 
capital equipment and to increase output. But in the same 
circumstances in the self-managed economy, there is no such 
incentive to invest. The incomes of workers in existing 
firms simply rise, without a corresponding increase in 
output. New demand has to be met by the State establishing 
new firms, but this further increases effective demand. It 
is not clear how the inflationary pressures generated in 
this way could be managed.
Criticisms of the implications of the model for long 
term development and the determination of the rate of 
investment refer both to the economic rationality of the 
model, and at the same time to its claim to be a 'socialist 1 
form of economy. As noted above, the State has no direct 
control over the long term development and growth of the 
economy, while at the micro-economic level, the incentive to 
invest is limited by the inadmissibility of non-work 
incomes. Workers will only be persuaded to defer present
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consumption for the sake of expanding capacity if this will 
lead to greater future incomes from economies of scale. But 
why should an existing enterprise collective sacrifice its 
present consumption, if expansion only replicates the 
present marginal rate of productivity of capital with a 
larger workforce? The macro-economic implications of this 
are both unemployment and low growth rates.
It is difficult to assess the rationality of the model
from a purely economic viewpoint, since the concept of
'rationality 1 itself implies some purpose towards which a
system is directed. Unlike the capitalist market, the
criterion of rationality is not maximisation of individual
self-interest, but is claimed to be maximisation of the
'social interest 1 . Thus it is not enough for the model
merely to demonstrate that it can replicate the same degree
of functional rationality as the capitalist market, since
the respective ends of the two economic systems are
fundamentally different. Thus we must ask not only whether
the model allocates resources efficiently, but whether it is
also able to maximise the 'social-interest'. The key
problem is whether the 'social interest' is understood as
comprising merely allocative efficiency, or whether it also
contains substantive goals of social justice. This problem
will be analysed more fully in the following chapter, but
for the purposes of the present argument, it is sufficient
to note of the self-management model that it appears to
reject implicitly the concept of a 'social interest' in
substantive terms, insofar as it restricts the role of the
State and plannng to supplementing the market rather than
replacing it, and to this extent it falls within the
25
individualist tradition espoused by Hayek (although the 
'individual' here is not a physical person but an artificial 
one - the self-managing enterprise collective). The 'social 
interest 1 is seen not in terms of a concrete and specific 
set of hierarchically ranked priorities, but in a set of 
conditions - worker self-management, enterprise autonomy, 
maximum scope for the market - as ends in themselves.
But if the 'social interest' is taken to mean equality 
in income distribution, or at least some concept of a 
socially just distribution, plus macro-economic control over 
the price level and the pattern and rate of long-term 
development, then the self-management model appears not 
appreciably superior to the capitalist market system in 
achieving these ends. Leaving discussion of the relative 
merits of these alternative concepts of the 'social 
interest 1 to the next chapter, let us consider a further 
possible model which attempts to combine the advantages of 
the market in terms of achieving a micro-economic efficiency 
with the pursuit of such substantive social goals which have 
normally been at the heart of socialist thinking. This is 
the 'regulated market 1 model of W^odzimierz Brus.
For Brus, an economic system can only properly be 
regarded as 'socialist' insofar as it fulfills two basic 
criteria: (1) the means of production must be employed in 
the interests of society, and (2) society must have 
effective disposition over the means of production it 
owns. 42 These two crieria do not per se rule out the use of 
the market. On the contrary, the non-market 'etatist' model 
falls down on both counts. In the first place, the poor 
economic performance in practice of the etatist model in the
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Soviet Union and Eastern Europe undermines the ideological 
assertion that the transfer of the means of production from 
private ownership into the hands of the State is enough of 
itself to guarantee that they will be used in the 'social 
interest 1 ; and in the absence both of the market as a source 
of objective information, and of democratic control over the 
State, there is no means of verifying that the State does in 
fact represent the general interest of society, rather than
the narrow self-interest of a self-appointed elite group
43 monopolising the State.
Thus the market plays an essential role in the
socialist economy, Brus argues, not merely for guiding
individual choice of profession, place of work, and
expenditure of personal income (which is not excluded in the
etatist model either), but also as a basis for
decision-making in the enterprise and industrial branch
concerning the size and structure of output, sources of
supplies and direction of sales, structure of personnel and
the form and methods of remuneration within the enterprise
or branch. Brus accepts the basic arguments in favour of
the market in terms of increasing efficiency, making
producers more responsibe to customer requirements,
providing incentives and fostering the development of
creative initiative at the local level. He also recognises
the link between enterprise autonomy provided by the use of
the market and the creation of the 'real preconditions for
workers' self-management as the vital element in socialist
democracy'. 45 To the extent that the market makes
self-management possible, it thus enhances 'effective
disposition 1 by members of society over the means of
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production. It also enhances the effectiveness of general 
control over the economy by the State, in supplying more 
accurate economic information on which the central 
authorities can base their decision-making. But in so 
doing, it only improves the process of planning, but it 
cannot replace it. While the market is a necessary 
component of the socialist economy, it too has what Brus 
identifies as 'objective limitations': 'a socialist society 
is, in the last analysis, the producer of use-values'. 
The advocacy of the primacy of the market, as in the 
self-management model, implies the dominance of production 
for exchange, or, in Marxist terms, 'commodity fetishism', 
with 'the disappearance of the hierarchical structure of 
aims... as well as the priority accorded to the production 
of use-values for which the production of exchange values 
can only be an effective means but which cannot be a 
substitute'.
Thus, Brus argues, the self-management model, by 
depriving the State of effective control over macroeconomic 
decision-making, which it leaves to the spontaneous 
operation of the market, avoids the basic responsibility of 
a socialist economy for the 'social interest' by 
de-politicising what are 'in the nature of things political 
decisions since they set and assess the objectives of the 
economy, they establish the general criteria and the 
framework which give economic calculation a definite 
character...' 48 In the practice of the model in Yugoslavia, 
he notes, there is a clear tendency to attach pejorative 
overtones to the adjective 'political', as being synonymous 
with arbitrariness and irrationality. But 'political
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decisions can obviously be arbitrary and mistaken, but this 
does not mean that they should (and can) be eliminated at 
any price in favour of partial decisions based on free 
market criteria...' 49 if political decision-making is 
regularly arbitrary and irrational, this is a symptom of the 
lack of effective democracy in the political system, he 
argues.
Brus' model falls into the category of what have been
50 described as 'visible hand' systems, as 'an attempt to
reap the benefits of central planning while avoiding some of 
the costs'. Central authorities are required in this 
model to relinquish their power to intervene in 
micro-economic decision-making by the individual enterprise, 
but to retain power over key decisions in the name of
assuring the 'social interest'. This is realised through
52 the following functions of the centre:
1. Basic macro-economic decision-making, especially 
as concerns long term development. This involves 
the division of the national income between 
accumulation and consumption; the determination 
of the main areas of investment; and the 
distribution of consumption income between 
different groups of the population. The key 
factor is 'to ensure central control over the 
basic flow of investment outlays' by giving the 
central authorities sufficient resources to be 
able 'decisively to affect the size and structure
c o
of growth of productive capacities'.
2. Central determination of the 'rules of behaviour 1
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for the enterprises. The 'natural' objective 
functions of enterprises, whether maximisation of 
profit, or of net income per employee, are not 
sufficient: 'It is necessary to lay down 
objective functions for the subsystems (i.e.
enterprises) using crieria drawn from
54 consideration of the system as a whole 1 . This
involves centrally set rules concerning the 
formation of enterprise funds for investment and 
wages. Thus the central authorities can ensure 
that the wage fund is 'compatible both with
market equilibrium and with the social structure
f • ,55 of incomes'.
3. Central control over prices, to ensure that they 
'express the preferences of society as a whole', 
in order that they guide economic units toward 
socially rational decisions. The 'parametric' 
character of prices should be maintained, but 
direct intervention by the centre may at times be 
necessary. This, however, should be regarded as 
exceptional ' if the logic of this mechanism for 
the functioning of the economy is to be
•4- ' ^.. 56maintained'.
The principles of 'solidarity' and 'mutual 
responsibility 1 inherent in socialism also require an active 
role for the State in those areas where 'social and 
individual preferences diverge to such an extent that to 
leave the provision of such services to individual choice 
would endanger the satisfaction of socially important
30
57 needs', - for example, in health, welfare, education and
defence. The State also has a role in compensating for 
inequalities of income, where the incentive effect of income 
differentiation is less socially desirable than the positive 
effects of ensuring 'equality of opportunity'. Of course, 
this function is not excluded in either the Lange model, or 
the self-management model; nor, of course, is it absent from 
capitalist economies.
Enterprises in Brus's model are legally autonomous.
Although they do not own their assets, they have full right
of disposition over them. They draw up their own plans
covering product mix, the introduction of new products,
technological development and the use of their own internal
investment resources, and the distribution of the wage and
bonus funds. They are fully responsible for their debts up
to the limit of their assets. The State is not allowed to
take assets from the enterprise in order to transfer them to
another at will; nor can the State issue direct orders to
enterprises to produce a specific item, except in
emergencies or special circumstances (e.g. for defence
purposes or to meet unexpected foreign trade needs). If
fulfilling such an exceptional task involves the enterprise
in financial loss, the State is obliged to provide
compensation. The expansion of the enterprise is not
entirely a matter of its own decision, however. While
enterprises will have some investment funds at their
disposal, major expansion will only be possible in
conformity with the objectives of the centrally set plan.
While banks will have funds to allocate on commercial terms
to competing enterprise projects, there will be centrally
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set investment quotas for branches, and banks will act as an 
arm of central policy, exercising financial supervision over 
the execution by enterprises of investment projects 
basically financed centrally according to the planned 
concept of development.
Although Brus sees the degree of enterprise autonomy
created in the 'regulated market 1 model as providing the
conditions for effective worker particiaption in enterprise
management, it should be noted that there is no necessity
for this form of organisation as an inherent requirement of
the model. A more traditional hierarchical system of
authority within the enterprise could also be retained. But
various problems are associated with this - firstly, who
would then be responsible for managerial appointment? It
would inevitably devolve upon the State. However, if this
meant a continuation of the practice, found in the
traditional Soviet model of managerial appointment by
industrial branch ministries, there would arise the danger
of reproducing the relationship of personal dependence of
the enterprise manager on his bureaucratic 'superiors', with
serious implications both for the autonomy of the enterprise
and the objectivity and impartiality of central economic
policy. This would be a particular problem for reform of
the 'regulated market' type in the specific context of
Eastern Europe, where deeply ingrained habits and attitudes
derived from long years of experience of the Soviet-type
system would strengthen this tendency by provoking
resistance on the part of both managers and ministerial
officials to the 'cutting loose' of the enterprise from its
familiar and security-enhancing network of contacts. But it
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is not 'merely 1 a problem of the subjective perceptions of 
the participants based on their habits of mind and 
assumptions inherited from former organisational patterns. 
The problem is to create an arm of the State institutionally 
separate from the economic policy-making and -implementing 
arm, with the special function of managerial appointment. 
What is required is a form of 'separation of powers' within 
the central authorities themselves, while at the same time 
maintaining a coherent and unified definition of the 'social 
interest 1 . Who would appoint the appointers of managers? 
Obviously not the policy-making and -implementing apparatus. 
The answer would appear to lie in the representative 
parliamentary institutions of the political system.
Such a system would appear in principle to be 
feasible, but it is not clear why it should be preferred on 
economic grounds to election of the manager by enterprise 
employees. The dangers of self-management pointed out above 
would be unliklely to recur in the very different economic 
context of the regulated market, where the enterprise is 
structurally conditioned,by the constraints exercised by 
the central authorities, to pursue the centrally determined 
'social interest' in pursuing its own interest. Moreover, 
the considerable advantages of worker self-management in 
terms of motivation, which Brus emphasises, would be 
forgone. Effective motivation 'demands not only that the 
whole workforce understand its target, but also that it
CO
identify itself with the aims of the organistion'. This 
is especially true of a more sophisticated modern workforce. 
Self-management also has an important socialising function: 
'Real self-management at the enterprise level should have
33
enormous educational significance for the development of
socialist attitudes to work and ownership at a general
59 
level ' . This in turn would bring economic advantage in
terms of motivation and commitment, and avoid the losses 
associated with careless and irresponsible use of equipment 
and theft of common property.
Furthermore, participation in enterprise
decision-making could compensate to some extent for the
lower material incentives available in the model due to
central wage regulation. This feature of the model is
likely to cause serious problems only to the extent that (a)
the central wage policy is perceived as unjust and (b)
material incentives are in fact the most important
motivating factor. It should be noted that the model
assumes a high degree of social consensus in favour of a
relatively egalitarian distribution pattern (this point will
be pursued in the next chapter), but also it builds in the
possibility of differential reward. This in turn could be
legitimised, as in the self-management model, by
democratisation of decision-making within the firm on the
distribution of the wage fund. Given general social
consensus in favour of egalitarian principles, the model
also builds in safeguards to counteract the possibility of
excessive differentiation, through general control of the
operation of the market, the prevention of cumulative
inequality between enterpises, and state social welfare
measures which both presuppose and reinforce the sense of
'social solidarity 1 and 'mutual responsibility'.
On point (b), Brus argues that material incentives are 
likely to decline in importance for motivation once a
34
certain level of affluence has been reached, and the
workforce itself becomes more sophisticated. Indeed, it
could be argued that the more sophisticated the economy, the
more difficult it becomes to create a really effective
incentive system based on accurately rewarding each
individual's contribution, when the end product is
inextricably a result of cooperation. Under these
circumstances, it would appear that the more democratic form
of internal enterprise organisation is likely to prove
economically more successful than the 'technocratic* or
authoritarian variant.
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CHAPTER TWO
POLITICS
Our task in this chapter is to elaborate on the 
political implications of the respective models of a 
socialist economy. Each model embodies a particular 
understanding of the 'social interest 1 in terms of their 
implications for freedom and democracy in the political 
system. The basic question is the relationship between 
individual and group 'private' interests and the 'social 
interest' .
The chapter looks at this issue in four sections.
First, in Section A, we examine Hayek's critique of planning
as inherently despotic; and consider the objection that
Hayek's implicit alternative of the market economy based on
private ownership neglects the impact that inequality can
have on the realisation of freedom. Section B examines the
self-management model, which is built upon a critique of
central planning very similar to that of Hayek. While it is
concerned to some extent with equality, this model is also
based upon a form of private ownership. It shares with
Hayek an ambiguous, negative definition of the 'social
interest' and an incoherent theory of the State. The
following section,(C) argues that Brus's model, combining
plan and market, can sustain a coherent definition of the
'social interest' in democratic terms, and is thus not
incompatible with freedom; on the other hand, it cannot be
shown that it is necessarily accompanied by democracy.
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Given the high degree of social consensus it assumes, it is 
likely to be realised in its democratic variant only 
exceptionally; it is thus more likely to be realised without 
democracy. The final section (D), draws out the conclusions 
from the preceding analysis of the internal logic of the 
respective models, and relates them to the question of 
change, of movement from one model to another, thus in turn 
introducing the empirical material to be covered in Part Two 
of the thesis; the comparison of reform in Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary.
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Section A; Hayek, planning and freedom
The first model of socialism presented in the previous 
chapter was that of central planning, based on the 
uoouniption of the possibility of objective determination of 
the 'social interest 1 in detail by an omniscient centre, 
with the role of the market limited to individual choice of 
occupation and pattern of personal consumer expenditure, 
within the range of alternatives made available by the 
State. Hayek's attack on socialism referred to this model, 
and was not limited to the question of its economic 
rationality, but was developed, in his work The Road to 
Serfdom into a political argument against planning as a 
threat to freedom and democracy.
The essence of the threat was seen to lie in the very
concept of a 'social interest 1 itself. It was not just that
the task of defining the 'social interest 1 in the degree of
detail required for central planning was in practice likely
to prove difficult, but that, in Hayek 1 s view, in principle
such a thing cannot exist: the basic flaw in the socialist
programme was in the assumption of the possibility of
omniscience. Hayek 1 s central point is that knowledge is
necessarily limited. It is simply not possible to know what
the 'social interest' is. The range of possible interests
is infinite, and the ordering of priorities can only be done
by each individual for himself on the basis of his own
knowledge of his circumstances and his own value system.
People's perceptions of their interests, Hayek assumes,
inevitably differ, and differ irreconcilably. The
possibility that people might have interests other than
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those which they themselves determine is ruled out. Thus 
the only possible meaning of the 'social interest 1 is in the 
establishment of a legal framework within which individuals 
can maximise their self-interest, which will guarantee the 
security of their persons and property, enforce contracts 
and provide stability of expectations. The idea of the 
'social interest' as a set of common goals can only be 
accepted in the case where the ends individuals define for 
themselves coincidentally agree:
What are called 'social ends' are... merely 
identical ends of many individuals - or ends to the 
achievement of which individuals are willing to 
contribute in return for the assistance they 
receive in the satisfaction of their own desires.
Moreover, the probability of agreement on common ends 
diminishes with the scope of collective action envisaged. 
Planning raises just this problem since it requires us
to agree on a much larger number of topics than we 
have been used to, and... in a planned system we 
cannot confine collective action to the tasks on 
which we can agree, but are forced to produce 
agreement on everything in order that any action is 
taken at all.
The result inevitably is the resort to coercion, since 'we 
can rely on voluntary agreement to guide the action of the
State only so long as it is confined to spheres where
. . , 4 agreement exists .
The attempt by Lange to preserve individual freedom 
within the framework of central planning by allowing free 
choice of occupation and of personal consumption patterns is 
seen as wholly inadequate, since the most important 
decisions which ultimately determine these choices 
decisions on investment, the allocation of resources between 
individual and collective consumption - are determined
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centrally by the State. Moreover, the somewhat vague 
reference by Lange to the State's right to interfere in the
price mechanism in the interests of some conception of
5 'social welfare' further restricts the meaning of freedom
of individual choice.
We can unfortunately not indefinitely extend the 
sphere of common action and still leave the 
individual free in his own sphere. Once the 
communal section, in which the State controls all 
the means, exceeds a certain proportion of the 
whole, the effects of its actions dominate the 
whole system... There is, then, scarcely an 
individual end which is not dependent for its 
achievement on the action of the State, and the 
'social scale of values' which guides the State's 
action must embrace practically all individual 
ends.
It is not enough that a society should be unanimous on 
the necessity of central planning for planning to be 
non-coercive, since it would not follow from this that there 
was also agreement on the ends to which planning must be 
directed. This would be
rather as if a group of people were to commit 
themselves to take a journey together without 
agreeing where they want to go: with the result 
that they may all have to make a journey which most 
of them do not want at all.
The idea that planning could be made non-coercive by 
subordinating it to the control of a democratically elected 
Parliament is also rejected. Parliamentary representatives 
are no more likely than individuals to be able to reach 
agreement on the unitary goal or scale of priorities which 
planning requires. The result of this, where an electorate 
wishes to see planning introduced, would be increasing 
popular impatience with Parliaments as 'ineffective talking
shops, unable or incompetent to carry out the tasks for
q which they have been chosen'. The solution would then be
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found in removing essentially political decisions from the 
democratic arena and transferring them to 'experts, 
permanent officials or independent autonomous bodies'.
Nor could Parliament approach the problem by 
delegating its powers to groups of experts on individual 
elements of the plan, while maintaining ultimate control 
over the final plan, since
an economic plan, to deserve a name, must have a 
unitary conception... A complex whole where all the 
parts must be most carefully adjusted to each 
other, cannot be .achieved by compromise between 
conflicting views.
Thus
the body charged with planning has to choose 
between ends of whose conflict Parliament is not 
even aware, and... the most that can be done is to 
present to it a plaiu which has to be accepted or 
rejected as a whole.
The role of Parliament is thus reduced to at best 'a useful 
safety valve'.
It may even prevent some flagrant abuses and 
successfully insist on particular shortcomings 
being remedied. But it cannot direct. It will at 
best be reduced to choosing the..persons who are to 
have practically absolute power.
For Hayek, the choice is stark: either
'individualism 1 , the market and freedom, or 'collectivism',
planning and serfdom. The place of democracy, however, is
rather more ambiguous. 'Freedom' for Hayek is wholly
'negative 1 , as freedom from arbitary power, which is
represented by the State as soon as it steps beyond its sole
proper function of defining and preserving the legal
framework within which individual freedom is maximised:
... it is not the source but the limitation of 
power which prevents it from being arbitrary. 
Democratic control may prevent power from becoming 
arbitrary, but it does not do so by its mere 
existence. If democracy resolves on a task which 
necessarily involves the use of power which cannot
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be guided by fixed rules, it must become arbitrary 
power.
It is not democracy, but the market itself, and the 
minimal State, which ultimately guarantee freedom. In fact, 
democracies by their very nature, being vulnerable to mass 
pressure to extend state power into the economy in the name 
of some concept of 'social justice 1 or equality, are 
potentially inimical to freedom:
... it is at least conceivable that under the 
government of a very homogeneous and doctrinaire 
majority democratic government might be as 
oppressive as the worst dictatorship.
The peculiarity of Hayek's definition of freedom is in
the assumption that it can be realised in the absence of
equality. The only equality which Hayek sees as relevant to
freedom is equality before the law. The idea that freedom
might be conditional upon equality is seen as confusing
'freedom' with 'power', a confusion which Hayek maintains is
'as old as socialism itself. Freedom is seen purely
'negatively 1 , in Isaiah Berlin's terms, as the absence of
coercion; 'equality', however, requires the exercise of
necessarily coercive power by the State, to redistribute
resources in opposition to the results obtained on the
'free' market. However, it is neither uniqueley socialist,
nor necessarily a 'confusion' to point to the possibility
that the market itself might have coercive aspects. Hayek's
distinction between freedom and power is hard to maintain,
since freedom 'from 1 necessarily also implies freedom 'to'
do or avoid doing something. Freedom is the unobstructed
realisation of some goal, 'the power of doing what one would
I O
choose without interference by other persons' action'. 
(Indeed, it is ironic in this respect that one of Hayek's
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contemporary disciples entitled his book propounding a
similar 'negative' concept of freedom is 'Free to
19 choose'.) To the extent that men are unequally placed on
the market, they are unequal in their opportunities to 
realise their goals. Unless we assume (a) that resources 
are not limited (and therefore that one person's advantage 
is not necessarily realised at the expense of others'), 
and/or (b) that men are fundamentally unequal also in their 
goals (in which case it is hard to see the justification 
even for 'equality before the law'), market inequality will 
also produce political inequality, and necessarily imply the 
limitation of freedom.
This is particularly clear where freedom leads to the 
concentration of ownership of the means of production. 
Non-owners have no choice - they are coerced - to submit 
themselves to the authority of those who own and control as 
a condition of their existence. Milton Friedman has argued 
that in circumstances where not all are owners of the means 
of production, non-owners are still free insofar as they are
not obliged to contract themselves as labourers to any
20 particular capitalist. But, as C B MacPherson points out,
The proviso that is required to make every 
transaction strictly voluntary is not freedom not 
to enter into any particular exchange ^ ..but freedom 
not to enter into any exchange at all.
Moreover, insofar as a capitalist economy is unable to 
guarantee full employment, non-owners are faced with the 
possibility of no choice at all between possible employers. 
In this case, the lack of opportunity to pursue their goals, 
their lack of 'freedom to choose 1 , is as absolute in the 
context of dispersed but unequal access to the means of
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production of the capitalist economy as it would be where 
the State was the sole source of employment.
Furthermore, insofar as equality before the law 
requires some material resources for its realisation (eg for 
legal fees), inequality of income may also lead to unequal 
ability to realise legal rights, and thus to political 
inequality. For such reasons, liberal theorists, and not 
only socialists, have seen freedom and equality as mutually 
supportive, rather than mutually exclusive. 'Equality of
estates causes equality of power, and equality of power is
22 liberty 1 , concluded Harrington in the seventeenth century.
The use of taxation to redistribute income certainly 
restricts the liberty of some, but also increases the 
liberty of others; but insofar as those deprived of part of 
their income are wealthy, thus enjoying superfluous income, 
while those who receive redistributed resources lack basic 
means of livelihood, liberty overall must be increased:
To be forcibly deprived of superabundance or even 
of conveniences impairs liberty less than to be 
forcibly ..prevented from appropriating 
necessities.
In this respect, the loss of liberty involved in 
taxation is no different from the loss of liberty involved 
in subordinating ourselves to the rule of law itself since 
this also implies a restriction on our ability to do 
whatever we choose, but at the same time increases liberty 
in general by making such restrictions apply equally to all.
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Section_B_: _Self-management, _inequality and the_ 'social 
interest'
Let us now turn to an examination of the self-managed 
model, which is founded upon a critique of the central 
planning model of socialism in many ways similar to that of 
Hayek. However, as an economic system it is not based on 
individual private property, but on what is argued to be a 
'socialist' form of ownership of the means of production.
The self-management model originated in a critique of
both individual private and state forms of property as
'alienated 1 , since in neither case, it was argued, were
workers actually able to realise their rights to control the
means of production. This would only meaningfully be
realised in the self-management of enterprises, formally
'owned 1 by 'society as a whole', while actual disposition
over the means of production was enjoyed by the members of
the enterprise work collective. The market, it was
appreciated, was a necessary condition of realising
self-management, and to that extent was necessary to the
realisation of freedom in socialism. Effective workers'
control could not be realised under central planning, since
all major decisions would be made by others. The
self-management model thus shares with Hayek a profound
suspicion of the State, as liable to develop an interest of
its own, separate from that of workers, as soon as its
functions are extended beyond merely guaranteeing the
conditions within which autonomous enterprises exercise
their decision-making rights. The proper functions of the
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State in this model , as explained in the previous chapter, 
are the provision and enforcement of a framework of rules of 
behaviour, and the support of the operation of the market. 
To this extent, the model shares Hayek's approach to the 
question of the 'social interest 1 which can be no more than 
a shared interest in these limited functions of the State, 
and/or the coincidental agreement of partial (in this case, 
group rather than individual) interests. Work collectives, 
as 'artificial individuals', can be relied upon to arrive 
spontaneously at the social good by pursuing their own 
interests; the 'social interest' cannot be identified 
substantively as consensus on a concrete, specific end or 
unified hierarchy of ends, but resides in the condition of 
minimum restriction on the individual's (Hayek) or group's 
<self-management) pursuit of his/its ends.
While democracy is essential to the self-management 
model at the level of the firm, as the essential means by 
which the interest of the work collective is defined, 
democracy at the level of the whole society, in the State, 
appears, as in Hayek's argument, to be possible, but not 
necessary. In practice, of course, in Yugoslavia, the 
self-managed model has been found compatible with the 
maintenance of one-party rule. This might even be argued to 
have been the condition for the continuing viability of the 
model in practice, since greater democracy at the level of 
the State, in a country such as Yugoslavia with profound 
regional socio-economic equalities, would inevitably have 
led to the type of mass pressure on the State which Hayek 
feared, leading to redistribution of resources by the State 
between regions, sectors and enterprises, thus undermining
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the market, enterprise autonomy and workers' property rights 
in the name of a substantive concept of the 'social 
interest' which is held to be incompatible with the aims of 
the model.
However, property rights in the self-management model 
are described by its advocates as 'socialist' in character, 
not private and individual, which would also lead to 
'alienation' of the workers. What difference does this 
make? C B MacPherson defines property as 'a right in the 
sense of an enforceable claim to some use or benefit of 
something, whether it is a right to share in some common
resource or an individual right in some
24 particular/things'. He identifies basically two forms of
property - common and private:
Common property is created by the guarantee to each 
individual that he will not be excluded from the 
use or benefit of something; private property is 
created by the guarantee that an individual can 
exclude others from the use or benefit of 
something.
It is acceptable to argue that property in the 
S( xf-managed model is not 'private' but 'common' (which 
would ippear to be necessary in order for the model to De 
described as 'socialist')? To th* extent that workers enjoy 
full autonomy in their decision-making, and receive in full 
the fruits of their use of the means of production assembled 
in the enterprise, the work collective would appear to be in 
fact the private owner of it. What we have is a new form of 
corporate private property. Access to the means of 
production and the right to income from its use is not open 
to any member of the whole society, but only to the members 
of the work collective of a specific enterprise. This in
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itself must cast doubt on the definition of the model as 
1 socialist 1 .
uii tne other hand, a peculiar feature of this form of 
private property is that while it excludes non-members of a 
work collective from the rights to property in a specific 
enterprise, it also provides the possibility for all members 
of society to enjoy ownership rights in some enterprise. 
The role of the State is to guarantee that all have the 
opportunity to become part of a corporate private owner, by 
establishing new enterprises, which is both necessary to the 
market in providing effective competition, and at the same 
time, deals with the problem of unemployment. The role of 
the State is to guarantee that all have the opportunity to 
become part of a corporate private owner, by establishing 
new enterprises, which is both necessary to the market in 
providing effective competition, and at the same time, deals 
with the problem of unemployment. Thus the private nature 
of enterprise property does not lead to fundamental 
inequality in the sense of division of society into owners 
and non-owners of the means of production. The model can in 
this respect provide greater equality than the capitalist 
market economy, and to this extent, greater freedom.
However, the model also will produce distributive 
inequality, insofar as the market is unrestricted and 
enterprise autonomy is guaranteed. The legitimacy of such 
distributive inequality depends on the assertion that 
incomes derive solely f from work 1 , not from property 
itself. 26 This in turn requires equality between competing 
enterprises, which their very autonomy makes impossible, 
since it allows successful enterprises to enhance their
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ruture advantages by retaining, within limits which can be 
set by the State, their profits from past performance which 
they may reinvest. Their future income will depend not only 
on future work but on past work; income thus acquires in 
part the character of property income, or economic rent. 
Not only would it contradict the economic logic of the model 
to tax away that element of income from enterprises - it 
would furthermore be illegitimate on the part of the State, 
as an infringement of the basic property right of the work 
collective. The only legitimate basis of taxation would be 
to provide the State with the necessary resources to
establish new enterprises, which is a condition of the
27 system functioning at all, as explained in Chapter I.
This need not necessarily remove all rent income from 
enterprises - there is no reason why the quantities should 
be the same. In any case, in principle taxation cannot be 
based on the idea of removing rent income, but can only be 
justified by the requirements of maintaining market 
equilibrium, which alone is held to constitute the 'social 
interest'. It is, as in Hayek, assumed that all have an 
equal interest in the maintenance of market equilibrium, but 
insofar as there is inequality between enterprises, this 
cannot be so.
The source of the problem, common to both Hayek and 
the self-management model, would appear to lie in their 
rejection of a substantive, or positive, concept of the 
'social interest' as implying equality. This leads to an 
incoherence in their respective implicit theories of the
State.
Both Hayek and self-management theory reject central
/f ^
\"I*
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planning as inherently despotic, since it rests on a 
monolithic substantive concept of the 'social interest 1 
which denies the legitimacy of individual and group 
interests, and can only be realised through coercion. Up to 
this point, their analysis is convincing. But they then 
proceed to suggest that any substantive concept of the 
'social interest 1 must be monolithic and therefore inimical 
to freedom for the individual. The assumption is that 
individual and/or group interests are the only legitimate, 
meaningful interests, with the further implication that 
conflict is normal, necessary, natural; consensus is 
sporadic, exceptional and very possibly forced. What then 
holds society together? The common framework of rules 
guaranteed by the minimal State. But this itself assumes a 
fundamental social consensus, deeper than the conflict of 
individual and/or group interests. There must be consensus 
on the rules, and shared principles of justice, in order for
conflicting parties to agree to be bound by the arbitration
") ft 
of the State.
On what basis might such consensus be achieved? It 
must depend on equality of individuals and groups, leading 
to their conviction that their interests are served equally 
by the framework of rules adopted. But the market and 
enterprise autonomy serve to produce cumulative 
inequalities. Thus the role of the State cannot be 
impartial - its role of enforcing the rules of the game and 
stabilising the market serves the interests of some more 
than others. In the absence of equality as the basis of 
consensus, both Hayek and the self-management model assume 
consensus on the justice of the unequal distribution of
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resources, which implies that the disadvantaged accept that 
it is in their interest to be disadvantaged. Now this is 
only rational if the disadvantaged are so temporarily - if 
they have equal opportunity to become advantaged. This they 
cannot have insofar as the market allows the cumulation of 
inequalities. Equality of opportunity requires the active 
intervention of the State in the redistribution of 
resources.
In other words, where what divides men in a society is 
more important that what holds them together, the role of 
the State cannot be impartial, but will favour particular 
interests, and not serve the 'social interest 1 , no matter 
how limited it is in scope. On the other hand, if the State 
is to play the role of impartial arbiter of the rules of the 
game, there must be a consensus, ie, that what holds men 
together be stronger than that which divides them. This in 
turn requires equality, or legitimation of inequality by the 
provision of equality of opportunity and the prevention of 
cumulative and self-perpetuating inequalities.
It follows from this that the concept of a 'social 
interest 1 does not necessarily have to mean unanimity, total 
consensus; all it implies is at least a minimal consensus. 
Where minimal consensus coexists with conflicting individual 
and group interests, it would appear also that a necessary 
condition of the impartiality of the State is democracy. It 
is therefore hard to accept Hayek's arguments against 
democracy, particularly his suggestion that domocracy could 
prove more tyrannical than non-representative forms of 
regime. One can accept Hayek's point that majority rule may 
develop in a tryannical way where society is dividied into
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relatively permanent majority and minority factions. 29 
Minority rights must also be institutionally guaranteed and 
protected. But this is not an argument against democracy 
per se, but only an illustration that democracy is unlikely 
to survive without broad social consensus. If a permanent 
majority persists in exercising its rights at the expense of 
a minority, this would lead to a violation of the 
fundamental consensus, leading either to civil war, the 
breakdown of the society and the secession of the minority, 
or the volunatry adjustment of the rules of the game by the 
majority, to rectify the position of the minority, 
indicating that the majority accepts the continued 
membership of the minority in the society as being in its 
own interests - thus reaffirming the initial consensus.
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Section C; The 'Regulated Market'. Consensus and Democracy
Now, if the notion of a substantive 'social interest 1 
is not unique to socialism, but is implied to some extent 
also in liberal theory (whether individualist or pluralist), 
then the argument against planning as inherently 
undemocratic and inimical to freedom must be modified.
Firstly, it is logically possible that a society 
characterised by complete homogeneity and equality could in 
fact democratically sustain full consensus on a unified 
hierarchy of ends, and thus combine central planning of the 
detailed 'monolithic 1 type with full individual freedom. In
such a situation, there could be no conflict between
30 individual and group interests and the social interest.
Of course, in practical terms the achievement of such a 
situation is unimaginable without the initial application of 
a very high degree of coercion to ensure total equality, and 
a sustained programme of enforced indoctrination to produce 
a homogeneity of values - thus fundamentally vitiating the 
quality of the consensus achieved. There is, moreover, no 
evidence that when such an attempt has been made (for 
example, in Cambodia under Pol Pot) that it has come 
anywhere near succeeding. This possibility is thus put 
forward for consideration not as a practical proposition, 
but as an abstract logical point.
But let us consider a less extreme position. Hayek
asserts that:
... in a planned system we cannot confine 
collective action to the tasks on which we can 
agree, but are forced to produce agreement on 
everything in order that any action is taken at 
all.
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But is this in fact the case? If the 'social interest 1
assumes consensus, but not necessarily total unanimity, why
must planning itself be all-embracing? We have seen how
Brus's concept of planning does not require that everything
be planned, but that it be limited to specifically political
decisions at the macro-economic level, which can be left to
the market, but which ought not to be, since this would
produce a result contrary to the 'social interest'. In this
case, planning requires not 'agreement on everything' but
merely the existence of basic social consensus on
substantive goals such as the distribution of income, the
long terra objectives of development, the rate of saving etc.
In principle, there is no reason why agreement on such
matters should not be reached - under certain practical
circumstances, to which we will return below. At this
point, however, we should pause to note that while Brus
defends his 'regulated market' model as the embodiment of
socialist principles, it is not necessarily incompatible
with the realisation of freedom and democracy in liberal
terms. Following from the arguments presented above, in
principle, it might even realise these goals more fully than
either the capitalist market or the self-management systems.
To return, however, to the question of consensus. It
is clear that Brus's model requires not merely basic
consensus, but a rather high degree of consensus in practice
- otherwise its implementation does indeed raise all the
problems of enforced compliance which Hayek quite rightly
identifies. The question is not whether consensus is in
principle possible, but whether in practice this high degree
of consensus is unrealistic, therefore only sustainable
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through coercion. Some degree of consensus is essential to 
the existence of a democratic society; the degree of 
consensus achieved, and therefore the democratically 
acceptable limits to the role of the State, will vary 
according to historical circumstances and the equality and 
homogeneity of the society. Both historical and systemic 
factors affect this:
The size of a country in which the model was 
introduced might be highly relevant to the formation of 
consensus. A small country is more likely (although it is 
by no means guaranteed) to generate a strong sense of 
community through the high degree of personal interaction 
possible among its members. This would be enhanced by 
ethnic, cultural and linguistic homogeneity within the 
society, especially where this led to the development of a 
strong sense of national identity, which has often 
legitimised an interventionist State. Alternatively, even a 
deeply divided society might be united in the face of an 
external threat, in the form of larger neighbouring powers 
with suspected imperialistic designs. This fear might be 
real enough to induce sectional leaders to tolerate and 
promote a highly regulated framework of interest
reconciliation, to prevent centrifugal pressures from
32 
threatening the integrity of the State.
In systemic terms, the degree of consensus required by 
Brus's model presupposes that the pattern of property 
ownership should not produce irreconcilable division of 
socio-economic interests. This would appear to require 
either equality of private ownership, or a form of communal 
ownership. As we have already seen, however, the rights
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implied in private ownership (whether the individual or 
group type) necessarily lead to cumulative inequality and 
non-work incomes, since the State cannot legitimately 
intervene to control and redistribute investment resources. 
Communal ownership entails the 'right not to be excluded
o o
from the use or benefit 1 of the means of production. The 
question is whether Brus's model can satisfy the criterion 
of this form of ownership.
The model is similar to the self-management model
insofar as it posits a right for all members of society not
to be excluded from access to the means of production; but
it differs from the self-management model in that workers'
property rights in the enterprise in which they work are
limited by correspondingly greater rights of the State,
particularly in the field of investment, and in controlling
the rules by which workers' personal incomes are to be
formed from enterprise income. The operation of the market
is limited by the State's powers of regulation in such a way
as to maximise equality of opportunity. Income inequality
is related to differential results of work realised on a
market which is regulated by the State according to a
concept of the 'social interest' embodied in economic policy
covering investment, prices and incomes. The possibility
that inequality may become cumulative is counteracted by the
State's right to control the use of, or to remove resources
from the enterprise for investment purposes; by the
existence of a statutory incomes policy; and by a high
degree of provision for collective consumption of goods and
services necessary to maintain equality of opportunity
(health, welfare and education). Incomes are thus derived
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from two sources - from work, and from redistribution by the 
State, as a share in socially-owned property.
To this extent, property in Brus's model would appear 
to be 'communal' in character, and as such, is likely to be 
supportive of social consensus.
There is thus a certain circularity in Brus 1 model.
For the degree of State intervention which it implies to be
compatible with democracy, there must be a high degree of
social consensus. Such consensus requires a highly
egalitarian property and distribution system - for which the
model also provides. On the other hand, if the State is not
subject to democratic control, the whole logical chain of
connections breaks down, since the State's claim to
represent the 'social interest* cannot then be legitimate.
In this case, the means of production cannot be said to be
'socially owned', and the position of workers, their
freedom, is as restricted as under full central planning of
the 'etatist' type. The pluralism of decision-making by
relatively autonomous enterprises becomes a sham - they are
not 'free' in their relations with the market, but
manipulated. Democracy, Brus therefore argues, is a
'necessary 1 element in the model. But here what is meant by
'necessary' is logical, definitional necessity - it is
necessary, for the model to be described as 'socialist',
that it incorporate political democracy. But Brus also
wishes to argue that democracy is an 'objective' necessity.
This implies something different: that the model is
practically unworkable without democracy; and also, that the
model provides not only the necessary, but sufficient
conditions for democracy.
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An argument for the objective necessity of democracy 
would have to show that without it, the behaviour of 
individuals, groups and the State itself would be radically 
different, and in particular, that they would act 
significantly less rationally in economic terms. It would 
appear to be possible to demonstrate quite convincingly the 
economic advantages of democracy in this model; however, it 
cannot be shown that the economic losses incurred by a 
non-democratic variant of the model would be sufficient to 
render the model wholly unworkable.
Firstly, we have seen in Chapter I that Brus argues
that democracy has a significant impact on motivation, and
34 that this may have clear economic advantages. But he does
not demonstrate that without democracy at either the level 
of the enterprise or of the State, the model would cease to 
function. It seems possible that the motivational 
advantages might be forgone without systemic collapse. The 
system would simply not be maximising its full potential - a 
fairly common state of affairs in the real world.
Further arguments put forward by Brus are similarly 
ultimately inconclusive. Without the check of open, 
competitive politics, it is certainly possible, even likely, 
that less competent and able people will be appointed to key
positions in the State, since, if not crude favouritism, at
35 least patronage will hold sway. However, democracy itself
cannot be a watertight guarantee that the most able will in 
fact hold power - by definition there can be no requirement 
of minimum IQ, or even education and qualification for 
holding elective office. The possibility of incompetents 
coming to power cannot be ruled out. Their tenure on office
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may, however, be less secure.
It follows from this that the problem of democratic 
control over the process of planning remains to be dealt 
with. As Hayek pointed out, planning necessarily requires 
the use of experts, who, by virtue of their own expertise 
and the amateur status of politicians in a democracy, are in 
a position to exercise great influence over the entire 
process of defining the 'social interest 1 .
There is an assumption in Brus' s argument that the 
broad objectives of policy will be accessible to the 
non-expert but educated and informed politician; and that a 
democratic framework will bring forth coherent variants of
o c
plan and policy for discussion. This does not seem an 
unreasonable argument. It does assume that the electorate 
will tend to favour the educated and informed candidate over 
a populistic demagogue. It also assumes that there will be 
more than one centre of planning - possibly universities 
might be commissioned to put forward rival plans to those 
produced by the State Planning Board. Neither of these 
assumptions would appear to be infeasible.
It is furthermore worth noting that Hayek's depiction 
of planning as 'rule by experts' is not accurate when 
applied, for example, to Soviet practice itself. The 
undisputed centres of power are the General Secretary, the 
Central Committee Secretariat and the Politburo of the 
Party. The majority of men who have occupied these posts 
have not been 'experts' themselves, but have evolved a 
highly effective set of means of maintaining political 
control over the experts, chiefly through the system of 
'nomenklatura'. Thus the Planning Commission, while itself
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a very powerful institution, is nevertheless subordinate to 
the Party. This would appear to demonstrate, in 
contradiction to Hayek, that experts and planners can be 
brought under political control. However, on the other 
hand, one may have justifiable doubts as to whether a 
democratic political system could evolve a similarly 
effective means of supervising its planners.
A third line of argument in favour of democracy in the 
model points to the danger of suppression of valid criticism 
where there are no guaranteed rights to free expression, 
publication and discussion. Democratic debate, discussion 
and criticism of the State can provide an effective check on 
'voluntarism 1 or wishful thinking in the plan and economic 
policy. It is not just that without free discussion and 
the observance of democratic procedure in policy-making, the 
legitimacy of the State's claim to represent the 'social 
interest 1 is undermined, but that this may lead it to
produce bad policies. The example of Poland under the
3 8 Gierek regime springs readily to mind. However, at the
same time, it cannot be completely ruled out in principle 
that a regime of 'enlightened absolutism' could construct a 
rational and coherent plan and economic policy. This could 
not legitimately be described as being in the 'social 
interest' in the absence of democracy, but this need not in 
itself affect the economic rationality of the model. All 
one can argue is that, on balance, a democratic regime is 
less likely to produce an economic catastrophe than a 
self-appointed elite.
A further argument which is relevant to the case 
concerns the impartiality of the State and the role of
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sectional interests. It can be argued that, without 
democracy, the ability of the State to act impartially must 
be impaired, and that this is likely to reduce economic 
rationality substantially.
The model concentrates control over substantial 
economic resources in the hands of the State. This must 
make the State the focus of very strong sectional pressures 
for the allocation of resources in a particular way - in the 
interests of particular sectional groups, which inevitably 
will present their claims in terms of the 'social interst 1 . 
If the State is not sufficiently strong or independent to 
resist certain sectional pressures, or if political leaders 
are in fact merely representatives of some (the most 
powerful) interests in society, then the result in the plan 
and economic policy might be the sacrifice of overall 
economic rationality in social terms to the protection of 
partial vested interests.
Hayek fears that precisely this would be the case -
any definition of the 'social interest' in substantive terms
will be a mere facade concealing sectional self-interest.
Moreover, democracy is more likely to lead to such
irrational bias than non-democratic regimes, in his opinion.
But Hayek assumes that his own 'Leviathan 1 could be
impartial without democracy, merely by virtue of its being
limited in scope - which, as we have already argued, is a
highly problematic position. On the other hand, it can be
argued that it is precisely democracy which can provide the
way out. The ability of the State to resist sectional
pressures must be enhanced by the relative openness of group
activity in a democratic context. Open debate and public
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criticism, on the one hand, serve to expose spurious claims 
by sectional interests to represent the 'social interest'. 
On the other hand, the state's authority, its ability to 
override sectional pressures in the interests of overall 
rationality, of the pursuit of the 'social interest 1 , would 
be strengthened by its democratic credentials, which enable 
it to claim legitimately that its definition of the 'social 
interest' must prevail.
Of course, democracy is not fail-safe - under certain 
conditions a democratic political framework might produce 
irrationality. Democratic theory does not necessarily 
assume that politicians are motivated by the disinterested 
pursuit of the common good; but it does assume that
electoral politics leads politicians to play a role of
39 aggregating and harmonising diverse interests. This in
turn assumes what we have already argued to be necessary 
conditions for democracy to work - that political resources 
are dispersed, and dispersed fairly equally through society; 
and that the diverse interests in society are predisposed, 
by an underlying social consensus, to bargain, accomodate 
and compromise. However, where interest conflicts are 
irreconcilable, where there is cumulation rather than 
dispersal of political resources and inequality, politicians
may well turn to the exploitation of differences, and the
40 
pursuit of a sectional line in policy making.
Again, our conclusion on this point cannot be 
clear-cut. Thee is no reason to hold, as Hayek does, that 
democracy will be more vulnerable than non-democratic 
regimes to sectional bias; democracy provides significant 
checks against this; but under certain adverse
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circumstances, even a democratic regime cannot guarantee 
that a plan and economic policy will be rational in terms of 
the 'social interest 1 . The biggest problem for 
empirically-based argument on this question is that most 
democracies in practice for the most of the time are 
operating under less than ideal circumstances.
Moreover, ultimately Brus's model cannot guarantee the
ideal circumstances requires for it to work both rationally
and democratically. It does indeed provide the possibility
of assuring a high degree of socio-economic equality which
will promote consensus, but it does not on the other hand
guarantee it: there are, after all, other sources of
conflict than socio-economic inequality - for example, value
conflict on religious or national grounds. While the
origins of such conflicts can usually be traced back
historically to socio-economic inequality and exploitation,
they do not necessarily melt away with the equalisation of
society. Value conflict cannot ultimately be reduced to
conflicts of material interest. Where a society is deeply
divided along religious or national lines, Brus's model
might only be workable in the absence of democracy in the
State. While the model is in principle certainly not
incompatible with democracy, it is not necessarily
democratic. While the assumption of a high degree of
consensus which it embodies is not in principle wholly
unrealistic, in practice, the circumstances in which the
model might be realised, as both rational and democratic,
are likely to be exceptional.
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Section__Dj The dynamic perspective__-__ marketisation , 
pluralisation and democracy
In the preceeding three sections we have examined in a 
theoretical way the political implications of the respective 
models of socialism from what might be described as a 
'static 1 perspective, by identifying the internal logic of 
the given model. In this final section of the chapter, we 
will relate the conclusions derived from this approach to a 
'dynamic* context, of change from one model to another - 
specifically, in the context of the introduction of 
market-type reform into a centrally planned economy.
We have seen how the monolithic definition of the 
'social interest 1 inherent in the centrally planned model 
necessarily produces a political system which is 
totalitarian, in the sense of denying the legitimacy of 
group and individual autonomy, or relegating them to a 
position of secondary, residual importance, permitted to 
exist only within a framework which is controlled and 
dominated by the superior 'social interest 1 . An economic 
system based on these assumptions is only compatible with 
freedom and democracy where the society is characterised by 
absolute consensus. Since such consensus is practically 
unobtainable, the model has always been accompanied 
politically by a high degree of coercion exercised by a 
single Party. The legitimation of the model as based on the 
'social interest* rather than the interests of the 
self-appointed party is derived from the Party's assertion 
that it possesses 'objectively correct' knowledge. 
Democracy as a means of defining the 'social interest' on 
the basis of individual and group participation is ruled out
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as superfluous, or even possibly counter-productive, since 
individual and group perceptions are necessarily of a lower 
order and subject to 'bias 1 . Coercion is redefined as 
'freedom', since coercion is held to be necessary to the
realisation of the 'true 1 interests of groups and
41 individuals.
The introduction of market-type economic reform,
whether of the self-management or regulated market variety,
necessarily challenges the totalitarian political framework
of the centrally planned system in a fundamental way, since
it requires recognition of group and individual interests as
both 'objectively necessary' and legitimate. Market-type
reform thus requires a fundamental revision of the Party's
legitimation doctrine, since it is not compatible with the
requirements of market models that the 'social interest 1 be
understood as all-embracing and monolithic, standing above
individual and group interests and enjoying a priori
superiority over them. It thus requires the definition of
the limits of the role of the State, and the acceptance of a
degree of pluralism. But does it imply the necessity of
democracy in the State itself? The answer is clearly no -
we have already seen that neither the self-management nor
the regulated market model requires democracy at the level
of the State. Both are logically compatible with either a
democratic, or a non-democratic (single party) regime.
The central point is to avoid the confusion of
'pluralisation' with 'democratisation'. 'Pluralisation 1
should be regarded as a quantitative measure, rather than as
a qualitative, systemic characteristic of a political
system. 'Democracy' is such a qualitative characteristic,
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referring not to the existence of separate group and 
individual interests, but to the context in which they 
emerge and the manner of their reconciliation. 
'Democratisation 1 as a process can only refer to improvement 
in the operation of already existing political guarantees 
embedded in democratic institutions. The transition from a 
non-democratic to a democratic regime cannot be achieved 
simply by moving along the quantitative axis of 
pluralisation, but requires a leap, a 'transformation of 
quantity into quality 1 , in the form of a political 
revolution, establishing institutional guarantees of basic 
rights and freedoms for individuals and groups. The lists 
of such guarantees is familiar: freedom of association, of 
alternative sources of information, and of expression; the 
right to vote in free and fair elections; the right to stand
for election, to compete for political support; and the
43 periodic repetition of elections.
'Pluralism 1 and 'democracy 1 are thus logically
separate. A democratic regime may be more or less
pluralistic: it may even, as in Rousseau's
individualistic-participatory model, be non-pluralistic, in
the sense that Rousseau rejects the legitimacy of organised
groups as participants in the process of defining the
'General Will'. On the other hand, non-democratic regimes
need not necessarily be totalitarian. Indeed, the pure
model of totalitarianism has long been recognised as
inadequate to the understanding of the realities of politics
±n communist one-party states. As an ideal type, it has
never existed except as an aspiration - as indeed, neither
has pure pluralism. Communist regimes have been categorised
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along a continuum of pluralisation by H G Skilling, who 
identifies 'quasi-totalitarian 1 , 'consultative 
authoritarian 1 , and 'democratising and pluralistic 
authoritarian 1 variants of single party rule, none of 
which can properly be regarded as democratic. The latter 
stage, however, is inherently unstable, and describes a 
revolutionary situation, being the point at which the 
quantitative degree of pluralisation provokes systematic 
crisis by putting the establishment of democratic 
institutions on the agenda.
In identifying the political implications of
market-type reform of centrally planned socialism of the
Soviet type, we need to distinguish between political change
as spontaneous, evolutionary and incremental adaptation, and
conscious and active remodelling of a system such as takes
place in a revolution. Whether marketisation leads to
revolution will depend not on the 'objective requirements'
of the reform model itself so much as the 'subjective'
element in the particular historical context, including the
willingness of the Party leadership to undertake reform and
the adaptation which it requires. This is not to suggest
that marketisation will not be a politically fraught
process; nor that marketisation can be introduced without
democratisation without some costs in terms of efficiency.
But it is implied here that marketisation is possible
without the collapse of one party rule and democratic
revolution; and that the costs of avoiding democratic
political transformation need not be intolerably high.
The aim of Part One of the thesis has been to 
elaborate in abstract theoretical terms the nature of the
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underlying problems of socialism, economic rationality, 
freedom and democracy. Part Two involves a comparative 
study of two cases of market-type reform, in Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary. Thee two countries have been selected for the 
similarity of their starting point as socialist systems 
based on the centrally planned model; for the similarity of 
their initial choice of reform model, of a regulated market 
type; and for the contrasting political developments they 
experienced - Czechoslovakia undergoing an 'interrupted 
revolution 1 in 1968, Hungary developing through the 1970s, 
not without conflict, but without systemic political crisis 
of the revolutionary kind. The aim of the comparative 
empirical study is to demonstrate how these cases illustrate 
the theroetical points presented in Part One of the thesis.
Firstly, in Chapter III, we will look at the political 
starting points of reform - the respective contexts into 
which economic reform was introduced. This background 
material will highlight the extent to which the differing 
patterns of political change which took place alongside 
economic reform were products of a particular, unique 
historical context, rather than of the functional 
requirements of the economic reform itself. Chapter IV 
focusses on the immediate political circumstances in which 
the decision to undertake reform was made in the respective 
countries. The major contrast to emerge is between the 
unity of the Kadar leadership, and its positive commitment 
to a coherent model of economic reform, and the political 
disarray of the Czechoslovak ledership, divided on many 
issues including the real meaning of reform. In Chapter V, 
we return to the theoretical issues raised in Part One. The
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chapter traces the development of reform thought in Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia. In both countries, intellectuals were 
aware of the political implications of the economic reform 
as a reconceptualisation of the 'social interest 1 , but in 
Hungary, public discussion of political reform as a 
necessary concomitant of economic reform was stifled, while 
in Czechoslovakia, the blossoming of sociology and political 
science promoted a much more far-reaching examination of the 
^ouuuij.c reform's social and political ramifications. In 
Chapter VI, we describe the political circumstances in 
Czechoslovakia which allowed economic reform to become a 
component part of a political movement of the intelligentsia 
driving towards 'democratisation' - the legitimation of 
pluralism and its incorporation, via political reform, into 
the institutions of the political system. The 
'politicisation' of the economic reform in Czechoslovakia, 
the chapter argues, was not a product of the 'objective' 
requirements of economic reform in practice, since very 
little of it was ever implemented. It was rather a product 
of the peculiar nature of the Novotny regime, which 
alienated a large part of the intelligentsia and thus 
focussed attention on the need for systemic political change 
not merely as a functional prerequisite of economic reform, 
but as an absolute good in itself. When we turn to Hungary 
in Chapter VII, we see a contrasting picture of economic 
reform introduced without either radical reform of the 
political system or political crisis as occurred in 
Czechoslovakia. The question raised by the Hungarian 
experience is, however, whether this 'depoliticised 1 reform, 
avoiding political change as far as possible, did not
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require compromises in the consistency of its implementation 
which eventually were to threaten the effectiveness of the 
whole endeavour.
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